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1. Let T be an w-person cooperative game with a (not necessarily 
superadditive) characteristic function v(B). We assume that T is 
normalized so that v(B)^0 for each coalition B, and v(i)~0 for 
i=l, 2, • • • , n. Let B = 5i, J52, • • • , Bm be a coalition structure, 
i.e., a partition of the set N= {1, 2, • • • , n\ into m nonempty coali-
tions. An outcome of the game with this coalition structure can be 
represented by a payoff configuration (x; B), where the payoff vector 
X2=(#i, #2, • • • , xn) represents the amount which the players receive. 
If we restrict ourselves to individually rational payoff configurations 
(i.r.p.c/s), i.e., to payoff configurations with x^O coordinate wise, 
then x must lie in the space Z(B)s5iX5
,2X • • • XSm) where 
Sj = {x
Bi^{xk}keBj:xk^0 and ]£*€£,• xk = v(Bj)} are geometric 
simplices for j=l, • • • , m. 
Let (x; B) be an i.r.p.c. for a game I\ and let v and \x be two dis-
tinct players in a coalition Bj of B. An objection of v against fx in 
(x; B) is a vector y
c, where C is a coalition containing player v but 
not player jx, whose coordinates {yu}, kÇîC, satisfy: yv>xv, yk^Xk 
and
 yHkecyk = v(C). A counter objection to this objection is a vector 
Z
D, where D is a coalition containing player ix but not player *>, whose 
coordinates {zk\, feG-D, satisfy: Zk^Xk for each fe in JD, z*Ê;y* for 
each k in CP\P, X^eD Zfc = z>(.D). 
DEFINITION. We shall say that player v is stronger than player /x 
(or, equivalently, that player \x is weaker than player J>), in (x; B), 
if v has an objection against fxt which cannot be countered. We denote 
this by v>ju. We shall say that both players are equal, and write 
v^p, if neither v> fx nor JX> v. 
REMARK. By definition, v~fx in (x; B) if v and jx belong to different 
coalitions of B. 
DEFINITION. A coalition Bj in B will be called stable in (x; B), if 
each two of its members are equal. 
DEFINITION. An i.r.p.c. (x; B) is called stable if each coalition in B 
is stable in (x; B). 
The set of all the stable i.r.p.c.'s is called the bargaining set Mf of 
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the game T. It was first introduced by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler 
[i]. 
2. Let (x; B) be an i.r.p.c. for a game T and let C be a coalition. 
Then e(Q^v(C) — 2»ec^» will be called the excess of C in (x; B). 
The following lemma follows from the definitions: 
LEMMA 1. If, in (x; B), player v has an objection y
c against player /x, 
and this objection cannot be countered, then each coalition D, for which 
pÇzD, e(D) ^e(C), must contain player v. 
THEOREM 1. Let (x; B) be an i.r.p.c. for a game T; then the partial 
relation > in (x; B) is never intransitive. (Also, it is asymmetric.) 
PROOF. Suppose, on the contrary, that a coalition Bj, JSyGB, con-
tains the players, say, 1, 2, • • • , t and that 1 > 2, 2 > 3, • • • , t — 1 > /, 
t> 1. Then, in (x; B), there exists an objection y
c" of player v against 
player (v + 1) (mod t), which cannot be countered, P=1, 2, • • • , t. 
Let Cv0 be a coalition which has the maximum excess among the 
Cv's. It follows by induction, using Lemma 1, that CVo contains all the 
players 1, 2, • • • , t. This is impossible, since it cannot contain player 
(j>o— 1) (mod t). 
The 5-person game, where i>(123) = 30, p(14)=40, ?;(3S) = 20, 
t>(245) = 30, v(B)=0 otherwise, furnishes an example in which the 
relation > is not transitive. Indeed, 1>2, 2>3, 1^3 in (10, 10, 10, 
0, 0; 123, 4, S). A similar example can be constructed to show that the 
relation ~ is not necessarily transitive. 
3. Let (x; B) be an i.r.p.c. for a game I\ We shall denote by 
(y
B>, x
N~
Bi; B) an i.r.p.c. which results from the previous one by 
holding fixed the payments to the players in N — Bj, and giving each 
player k in Bj, J5/EB, an amount yu. Clearly, y
B>= {yk}, k&Bj, is a 
point in Sj. Let £j(x) be the set of points y
B> in Sj having the property 
that in (y
B', x
N~
B*\ B), player i, iGBj, is not weaker than any other 
player. The set E)(x) is closed and contains the face ;y< = 0 of the 
simplex S3. (If 3\- = 0, player i can always counter object by playing as 
a 1-person coalition.) We shall prove that Mj(x)=0iGBj E
ij(x)j*0. 
Indeed, in view of the lemma of B. Knaster, C. Kuratowski, and S. 
Mazurkiewicz [3], it suffices to prove that \JieB,- £j(x) = 5;-; i.e., that 
for any i.r.p.c. (x; B), and any coalition Bj in B, there exists a player 
i, i(~B, such that i> k in (x; B) for all k. If this is not the case for 
an i.r.p.c. (x; B), one arrives at a contradiction to Theorem 1. We 
have thus proved : 
THEOREM 2. Let (x; B) be an i.r.p.c. for a game T, and let £y£ B. It 108  MORTON DAVIS AND MICHAEL MASCHLER 
is possible to modify the payments to the players in 23/, without changing 
the payments to the players in N—B,-, in such a way that Bj becomes 
stable. 
COROLLARY. There always exists an x such that (x; iV)GM^. 
4. On the basis of these results, B. Peleg presents an ingenious 
proof in the subsequent research announcement [4], that for each 
coalition structure B, for a game T, there exists a payoff vector x, 
such that (x; B)GMf. His proof is indirect, and does not furnish 
more properties of M^. Therefore, a direct proof is also desirable. 
There exist examples which show that the sets Mj(x) are not neces-
sarily convex. From the definitions of these sets it follows that they 
are closed polyhedra. If one could show that these polyhedra are 
acyclic, i.e., have only trivial homology groups, then one could use the 
Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed-point theorem [2] to prove Peleg's re-
sult in a direct fashion. So far, we know that Mj(x) is acyclic if the 
coalition Bj contains less than 4 players, and we did not find counter-
examples for larger coalitions. We also know that Ej(x) are always 
contractible over themselves to a point, and hence they are acyclic. 
These results follow from: 
LEMMA 2. If 1> 2 in (x; B), 1, 2E.B/GB, and if y
5>' is a point in Sj 
such that yi^x, ^^^2, and 
xi-yi^T, (yi - *»), 
iep 
where P is the set of players in BJt different from player 2, for which 
yi>xit then 1> 2 also in (y
B*t x
N-
B>'; B). 
The proof is straightforward, once one realizes that these condi-
tions make it "more difficult" for player 2 to object and "easier" for 
player 1 to counter object. 
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